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Abstract 
Current risk identification practices applied to patient safety in healthcare are insufficient. The 
situation can be improved, however, by studying systems approaches broadly and successfully 
utilised in other safety-critical industries, such as aviation and chemical industries.  
To illustrate this, this paper first investigates current risk identification practices in the 
healthcare field, and then examines the potential of systems approaches. A systems-based 
approach, called the Risk Identification Framework (RID Framework), is then developed to 
enhance improvement in risk identification. Demonstrating the strengths of using multiple 
inputs and methods, the RID Framework helps to facilitate the proactive identification of new 
risks. 
In this study, the potential value of the RID Framework is discussed by examining its 
application and evaluation, as conducted in a real-world healthcare setting. Both the application 
and evaluation of the RID Framework indicate positive results, as well as the need for further 
research. 
 
Practitioner Summary: The findings in this study provide insights into how to make a better 
amalgamation of risk identification inputs to the safer design and more proactive risk 
management of healthcare delivery systems, which have been an increasing research interest 
among human factor professionals and ergonomists. 
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1. Risk Identification in Patient Safety 
In healthcare, a range of studies have been conducted to accelerate improvement in patient 
safety and quality of care, since the pioneer report ‘To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System’ published by the US Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2000). While earlier studies indicated 
the frequency of medical errors remains high worldwide (Classen et al., 2011; James, 2013; 
Kurutkan et al., 2015; Unbeck et al., 2013), some also suggested that further research is 
imperative to transform healthcare to make health systems safer for patients (Bates et al., 2001; 
Leape and Berwick, 2005; Wachter, 2004). 
To accelerate improvement on patient safety, there is a growing awareness in Human Factors 
and Ergonomics (HFE) (Gurses et al., 2012). Various frameworks have been developed and 
adopted with the support of HFE to improve healthcare in different ways (Carayon et al., 2014; 
Hettinger et al., 2015; Hignett et al., 2013; Jun et al., 2017). As one of the fundamental 
characteristics of the HFE, systems approaches have been proposed to result in important 
benefits to healthcare, in terms of identifying patient safety risks through comprehensive 
system coverage. However, systems approaches are still underused in healthcare in contrast to 
other safety-critical industries, such as aviation (Simsekler et al., 2015b).  
As an important aspect of most systems approaches, it was found that proactive risk 
identification via prospective hazard analysis (PHA) methods are also underused in patient 
safety context (Ward et al., 2010). While other industries adopted such proactive systems-based 
risk identification approaches to provide more efficient and safer systems, healthcare is still 
relying mostly on reactive approaches, such as incident reporting and investigation (Card et al., 
2014; Waterson and Catchpole, 2016). While little measurable evidence and improvements 
have been so far shown through such reactive approaches (Hudson et al., 2012), some further 
practical limitations, such as hindsight bias and underreporting, have been also experienced in 
healthcare (Kessels-Habraken et al., 2009; Sari et al., 2007).  
Earlier studies investigated the adoption and applicability of systems-based proactive risk 
identification and assessment approaches, such as PHA methods, for the redesign of healthcare 
systems (Ward et al., 2010). It was found that there is only a very slow and sporadic adoption 
of PHA methods in healthcare (Lyons, 2009). Here, Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) can 
be mentioned as the only exception as it has gained greater acceptance in healthcare as the most 
widely used PHA method (Chiozza and Ponzetti, 2009; Ward et al., 2010). For instance, in the 
US, Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) requires 
accredited organizations to use FMEA as part of their organisational patient safety policies 
(Chiozza and Ponzetti, 2009). While FMEA has supported organisations to be more proactive, 
many limitations were also noted, mainly due to time and cost constraints (Linkin et al., 2005; 
van Tilburg et al., 2006). To overcome such constraints, recent studies recommended to adopt 
less time intensive methods, such as Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT), to help achieve 
comprehensive risk identification by spending less time (Potts et al., 2014). However, there is 
still no clear evidence regarding the effectiveness of such proactive methods in identifying 
patient safety risks.  
In addition to such issues, a number of concerns were also raised about the validity and 
reliability of PHA methods in healthcare applications (Franklin et al., 2012; Shebl et al., 2009; 
N. A. Shebl et al., 2012). For instance, earlier research showed that validation of PHA methods 
is methodologically challenging, despite a few investigations proving their reliability (Potts et 
al., 2014). Beyond this, only a few studies have highlighted the use of multiple reactive and 
proactive methods to successfully provide a comprehensive view of risk in a given healthcare 
system (Kessels-Habraken et al., 2009; Potts et al., 2014). Potts and colleagues (2014) also 
pointed out that PHA methods should not be used in isolation in providing a comprehensive 
description. However, there is no evidence in the healthcare literature of how well such an 
amalgamation, using multiple inputs from both reactive and proactive risk identification 
approaches, can be demonstrated. These issues taken together show that there is still a need to 
implement an improvement in risk identification, which will contribute to patient safety 
improvement. 
In summary, it has been noted that proactive systems-based risk identification approaches are 
underused in patient safety context. Recent research also highlighted the need in healthcare 
field to adopt a new approach to identify and mitigate patient safety risks by learning from the 
experiences of other safety-critical industries (Hudson et al., 2012). The potential exists, 
therefore, for improving the risk identification process by identifying the areas needing 
improvement within current risk identification practices, and by adopting HFE characteristics, 
such as proactive systems approaches. In the proposed study, all these needs and requirements 
are aimed to be captured and then be merged into a new Risk Identification Framework (named 
as RID Framework), which can potentially demonstrate the strengths of different reactive and 
proactive inputs, while evolving a comprehensive risk view within a systems approach. The 
RID Framework would therefore provide fundamental guidance on the effective use of risk 
identification within the scope of risk management. 
 
2. Capturing Requirements for the Proposed Risk Identification Framework 
At the outset of the design process in the current study, data and information were methodically 
collected to help determine the generic and specific requirements to include in the proposed 
RID Framework. In developing a comprehensive list of requirements, real-life examples from 
healthcare and other safety-critical industries were reviewed to capture the generic 
requirements.  
To address requirements of the proposed RID Framework, it is imperative to obtain a better 
understanding of the current risk identification practice. Therefore, along with the literature 
review, research methods — including (1) content analysis of NHS documents, (2) interview-
based questionnaires, and (3) case studies — were employed to understand current risk iden-
tification theory and practices in the healthcare field. First, in order to determine what support 
is currently provided for risk identification in healthcare, the current research included a 
content analysis of risk management policies and procedures from the NHS Trusts in the East 
of England region. While these documents were helpful in understanding and current theory in 
risk identification as applied to patient safety, it was also useful to become familiar with the 
diverse terminology used in healthcare procedural documents.  
 
Further, the documents showed that incident reporting is the main method for risk identification 
in the chosen region, while providing insufficient support for the use of prospective risk 
identification methods, except safety walkabouts (see Simsekler et al., 2015b for more 
information). While content analysis provided significant insight into prescribed risk 
identification practice, we secondly conducted interview-based questionnaires to gain greater 
knowledge of current risk identification practices. The main focus of this stage was narrowing 
down the knowledge and experience healthcare professionals have regarding the practice of 
risk identification (see Simsekler, 2015 for more information). Similar to the findings in content 
analysis, we found limited knowledge on PHA methods, or any proactive systems approach, 
but emphasis on the use of incident investigation and safety walkabout in risk identification 
practice. Third, case studies were carried out to gain a greater understanding of the practical 
application of risk identification methods and their contribution to the overall risk identification 
practice (see Simsekler, 2015 and Simsekler et al., 2015a for more information).  
Each research method provided valuable insight into current risk identification practices. As a 
result, we captured a range of requirements addressing the gaps and shortfalls in the current 
practice of risk identification. In particular, the findings showed a lack of systems approaches 
and safety culture to promote proactive risk identification. While the results showed no 
evidence of the use of PHA methods or systems approaches in the identification of risks, we 
also found that description and understanding of risk varies considerably among healthcare 
workers. As mentioned earlier, the content analysis and questionnaires showed that risk 
identification is mainly conducted through incident investigation and safety walkabouts, which 
are reactive and proactive, respectively. It was also found that risk registers also play an 
important role in putting all risk information into a single picture; however, it appears that poor 
amalgamation of risk information from multiple methods is an impediment to the overall 
success of the risk identification process. These are the factors most in need of improvement 
in the current practice of risk identification. 
In current risk identification practices, methods used for improving patient safety can be 
described with reference to their reactive or proactive natures. With respect to the current state 
of risk identification in healthcare, a link between reactive and proactive methods can be forged 
by constructing a bridge between incident investigation tools and safety walkabouts, as these 
two are most common methods currently used in healthcare (Simsekler et al., 2015b; Ward et 
al., 2010). Further, systems approaches, such as PHA methods, should be able to dovetail with 
the current methods in order to take advantage of their power thanks to their main inputs, such 
as brainstorming and use of system mapping approaches (SMAs, also known as process maps, 
process models). One of the suggestions of this study is that this can be accomplished with the 
implementation of a framework that provides a common, valid structure to bridge the several 
methods that can contribute to improving current risk identification practices.  
While the analysis of current risk identification practice provided significant insight into the 
use of current inputs, such as incident investigation and safety walkabouts, we also analysed 
the usability of SMAs, the common inputs used in PHA methods as part of the HFE approaches 
(Wooldridge et al., 2017), along with brainstorming. We therefore investigated the potential 
contribution of such a framework, linked to currently employed methods, and propose a 
relationship involving current methods and inputs from PHA methods. In order to examine the 
contribution of different SMAs and brainstorming in the risk identification process, we carried 
out workshops on SMAs and FMEA in a formal risk identification exercise. 
We evaluated a set of SMAs to assess their potential contribution to the identification of risks 
in a newly established mental health service. The key stakeholders of the chosen service, 
including clinicians, managers, and administrative staff, were individually asked to evaluate 
the following SMAs (based on the selection criteria in the PHA Toolkit (Clarkson et al., 2010)) 
according to their usefulness in identifying patient safety risks: organisational, information, 
task, flow, communication, and system diagrams. They were evaluated with the help of the risk 
categorisation framework, which classifies the risk sources as follows: patient-sourced risks, 
staff-sourced risks, equipment-related risks, communication risks, task-related risks, 
organisational risks and environmental risks (Simsekler et al., 2015a). 
Throughout the evaluation of the SMAs with healthcare staff, we noted that risk sources 
interacted in the system, and may have influenced the outcome of the delivery of care. It is 
therefore important to identify the description of the systems, their elements and interactions 
in a dynamic and complex healthcare context. The evaluation showed that SMAs are useful in 
risk identification. For instance, results showed that the system diagram is the most useful 
diagram for risk identification since it comprehensively represented how data and information 
are transferred through system activities. More importantly, the evaluation resulted that each 
type of SMA has a unique strength or limitation in identifying particular risk sources. For 
instance, the flow diagram was found as the most helpful diagram type in identifying commu-
nication risks, followed by the communication diagram. Throughout the evaluation workshops, 
we also found that amalgamation of the use of multiple SMAs can be helpful in identifying a 
comprehensive list of risks, though it may not be feasible to use all diagrams due to limited 
resources, such as limited time, resources, and experience of system users with SMAs (see 
Simsekler et al., 2018 for more information). 
After running the evaluation workshops for SMAs, we then also conducted FMEA exercise to 
determine its contribution to the risk identification process, through the use of system diagram, 
since it was found as the most useful diagram for risk identification during the evaluation of 
the SMAs. Regarding the results of the FMEA exercise, we found that FMEA has merit in risk 
identification, but also had limitations in the selected healthcare context. Though FMEA 
provided a useful opportunity for risk identification along with the system diagram, we 
suggested that FMEA should not be used as a stand-alone tool in identifying patient safety 
risks. For instance, FMEA was limited in the identification of external and environmental risks, 
as the failure modes were only identified according to the process steps shown in the system 
diagram provided, and no identification of external risks was allowed. As with the previous 
results, we recommended that the outputs from FMEA should not be used in isolation (Ashley 
and Armitage, 2010; Franklin et al., 2012; N. Shebl et al., 2012; Shebl et al., 2009), but should 
be treated valuable to support the overall risk identification practice. Particularly, the primary 
inputs of this technique, brainstorming and the use of SMAs, can certainly contribute to the 
improvement of current risk identification practices. 
We, so far, investigated gaps and shortfalls in current risk identification practices, and provided 
insights into the potential contribution of the inputs, such as SMAs and brainstorming, used in 
most systems approaches. As a result of all findings, we developed a framework to merge all 
these requirements and learning points, as detailed in the following sections.  
In order to organise these requirements, typical risk identification process characteristics, such 
as inputs, process [method(s)], and outputs, are used. Hence, all identified generic and specific 
needs were organised and adapted with regard to their specific characteristics to determine 
where they should be embedded into the proposed risk identification framework. Eighteen 
requirements were thus identified and categorised, as shown in Table 1.  
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
3. The Structure of the Risk Identification Framework 
The requirements captured throughout the research are listed in Table 1. The proposed 
framework, which considers these requirements, is underpinned by a proactive systems-based 
approach to risk identification, and supports its users in understanding the overall system within 
a socio-technical perspective. The rationale behind the framework is an integrated approach to 
proactive risk identification, employing multiple inputs through brainstorming and safety 
walkabouts. The framework bridges the gap between reactive and proactive inputs, helping risk 
identification in healthcare become more proactive. The risk identification process, using this 
framework, could potentially show the strengths of using multiple approaches to enhance 
patient safety improvement.  
The current research concluded that three stages should be defined in the structure of the frame-
work, as depicted in Figure 1. These are (1) system familiarisation, (2) identification of risks, 
and (3) presentation of risks. 
 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the risk identification framework includes a range of inputs, processes, 
and outputs in its structure. We aim to address each requirement through these three 
fundamental parts in the structure, as shown in the first three columns in Table 1. These are 
also detailed to provide fundamental guidance1 to healthcare users. 
3.1. Stage I: System Familiarisation 
This stage considers a range of inputs to help increase understanding of the system, and 
awareness of potential patient safety risks that can occur in complex and changeable healthcare 
systems. The following steps are included in this stage. 
Step-I System Description: It is important to have a clear system description, to increase 
understanding of how such systems behave, interact with their environment, and pose risks to 
patients. In this step, descriptions of the system, including its inputs, outputs, and boundary, 
are essential aspects. 
The system description can be strengthened with two approaches, depending on available 
resources. These are (1) brief textual and graphical system descriptions, and (2) system 
mapping approaches. While such textual and graphical system descriptions are expected in all 
applications of the framework, the use of SMAs is suggested, depending on resource 
availability. Some flexibility is allowed in the RID Framework depending on the resource 
availability, and use of SMAs is one of the flexibility given. 
                                               
1 Full guidance on RID Framework can be found in the Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of 
Cambridge, titled as “Design for Patient Safety: A Systems-based Risk Identification Framework” (Simsekler, 
2015).  
- Brief Textual and Graphical System Description: Visual patient-centred maps can be used, 
or produced by participants, in this step. The objective of the system and its boundary are 
described, taking into account different system elements that directly or indirectly interact with 
the patients, subsystems, interfaces, and functions, while keeping patients at the centre of the 
system. Depending on availability, physical layouts and relevant documents can also be used 
to identify possible risk points in the selected healthcare environment. 
- System Mapping Approaches: During risk identification, system descriptions can be 
supported through the use of SMAs. In addition to aiding the description of the system, such 
approaches also strongly support identification of possible risk points in the context of patient 
safety. The framework considers six different SMAs, based on the PHA Toolkit (Clarkson et 
al., 2010). It may not always be feasible to use all diagram types in the risk identification 
process, due to time and cost constraints. Therefore, a number of criteria are suggested in the 
RID Framework for selecting the most appropriate SMA, depending on the nature of the 
healthcare system, as shown in Table 2. As detailed in our earlier study (Simsekler et al., 2018), 
the diagrams are marked with two different sizes of tick marks (bigger mark means more 
useful) indicating their usefulness in identifying particular types of risk sources.  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
Step-II Risk Sources: Given dynamic and complex healthcare systems, different risk sources 
can trigger hazardous situations, potentially harming patients. It is therefore essential to 
consider as many risk sources as possible within a classification to help participants familiarise 
themselves with the given system and potential risk sources. 
There are a number of classifications that can be used to categorise patient safety risk sources 
(Carayon et al., 2006; Rogers, 2002; Runciman et al., 2006). There are also extensive research 
on particular type of a risk source, such as environmental risks, indicating their impact on 
patient safety and quality of care in particular healthcare settings (Hignett and Lu, 2010; Joseph 
et al., 2017; Maben et al., 2016; Pati et al., 2016; Taylor and Hignett, 2016). While all studies 
may provide suitable vehicle for capturing potential risk sources, we particularly considered 
the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) Root Cause Analysis (RCA) contributing factors 
classification framework to use reactive inputs proactively to help transition between reactive 
and proactive approaches. While earlier research suggested the usability of the NPSA 
framework in risk identification (Card et al., 2012), our earlier evaluation via interview-based 
questionnaires also showed that most healthcare staff are familiar with this framework 
(Simsekler, 2015).  
The NPSA framework lists the following factors: patient factors, staff factors, organisational 
risks, communication factors, equipment factors, work environment factors, task factors, 
training and education factors, and team factors. However, as detailed in our earlier study 
(Simsekler et al., 2015a), it was sometimes difficult to differentiate the education and training 
factors, and the team factors, from organisational and staff-related risks. To obtain a more 
accurate classification, the final decision was made to use these factors as sub-classifications, 
subordinate to organizational risks and staff-sourced risks, depending on the situation. The 
following classification was therefore developed, subsuming most of the common 
classifications, such as The Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model 
and the NPSA classification: (i) patient-sourced risks, (ii) staff-sourced risks, (iii) equipment-
related risks, (iv) communication risks, (v) task-related risks, (vi) organisational risks and (vii) 
environmental risks. 
As can be seen, the classification of risk sources is also correlated with the SMAs selected in 
this research. It is easy to describe the characteristic of interest using this categorisation, and 
select the most appropriate type of SMA during risk identification. 
Step-III Nature of Hazards:  
In dynamic and changeable healthcare systems, any deviation in the system might trigger 
hazards, potentially causing harm (Carayon et al., 2006). As the nature of the system elements 
is, in general, different, they can introduce different forms of hazards into the system being 
studied. It is therefore important to consider the different natures of hazards, because they can 
potentially influence the outcome of care delivered in changeable healthcare systems. 
In order to distinguish the different natures of hazards, the following classification, produced 
by the Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (WHSQ) (2007) is used to stimulate the 
imagination of new risks in different natures: 
!! The obvious hazard is apparent to the senses  
!! The concealed hazard is not apparent to the senses  
!! The developing hazard cannot be recognized immediately, and develops over time  
!! The transient hazard is an intermittent or temporary hazard  
This categorisation allows the identification of hazards present in the workplace. It can be 
applied to healthcare contexts, where the system is complex and therefore involves a variety of 
different hazards. The use of this kind of categorisation can enhance the understanding of the 
system and its components’ behaviour in the risk identification process. 
Step-IV Time: Using this input, the users are expected to consider past, present, and possible 
future, to cover a range of risks. The following questions are considered in this stage: 
!! Past: What has gone wrong in the past? 
!! Present: What could go wrong currently? 
!! Future: What could go wrong due to change? 
To consider the ‘past’, it is important to review some examples of incidents that have 
previously occurred in the selected healthcare setting. A greater awareness of past errors 
increases users’ knowledge about the chosen setting and the imagination of related risks. 
Depending on available time, different types of incidents can be considered in this step. In 
addition to incident reports, reactive results from claims and patient complaints can also be 
used to strengthen the bridge between reactive and proactive approaches. 
Along with the past, ‘present’ and ‘future’ should be considered, to be more prognostic in risk 
identification. The categorisation of risk sources is suggested, to aid consideration of future 
areas of change, as prompts for imagining future risks. Hence, possible changes in technology, 
functions, and procedures are simply but explicitly considered, to capture additional risks that 
may not be identified by current risk identification methods used in healthcare. 
Participants are therefore asked to identify both present and possible future risks (due to 
change), with the help of the categorisation of risk sources. For example, they are asked, “What 
can go wrong in the system due to communication risks?” The RID Framework is therefore 
expected to systematically consider the accumulation of interactions within and among the 
identified risk sources, thereby identifying new risks in given systems. 
3.2. Stage II: Identification of Risks 
At this stage, the aim is to gather multiple risk identification approaches, to provide an 
exhaustive list of risks. It should be noted that the framework aims to provide a systems 
approach, together with previous knowledge and experience gained through reactive 
approaches. Due to the different natures of the selected approaches, the potential exists to iden-
tify different sets of risks, which helps to provide as much relevant risk information as possible 
for selected systems. 
In the proposed RID Framework, the results of incident reporting (past time consideration as 
detailed in the previous section) are used as input to raise awareness of past errors, whereas 
brainstorming is promoted as the risk identification approach, together with safety walkabouts. 
In the proposed framework, the brainstorming approach (the main input in most PHA methods, 
along with SMAs) is incorporated into the centre of the framework, between the two most 
common practices, incident investigation and safety walkabouts. The aim is to build a bridge 
between reactive and proactive tools, and potentially provide better adoption of PHA inputs 
(e.g., brainstorming and SMAs) to the current risk identification practice. 
Combining multiple methods may seem redundant, and contradictory to the idea of the RID 
Framework, which is proposed as a less resource-intensive approach. To respond this, different 
methods were brought together with a number of selection criteria. In the framework, 
brainstorming is identified as the central approach, while safety walkabouts are an adjustable 
approach. This means that safety walkabouts can be omitted in some cases, depending on the 
nature of the specific healthcare systems. Another consideration in this stage is making the use 
of the framework easy and suitable for execution by individuals or teams. Inputs in 
brainstorming and safety walkabouts should be functional in both individual and team-based 
uses. 
It can be said that using the proposed inputs may stimulate the imagination of new risks in a 
given system. Taking a systems approach, along with the categorisation of risk sources, the 
framework does not focus solely on safety risks that have occurred in the past, or on present 
risks, but aims to capture potential future risks as well. Therefore, possible changes in 
technology, medical and communication equipment, functions, and procedures within the 
seven categories are taken into consideration to identify and prepare for the emergent risks of 
the future, in complex healthcare systems. As an integrated approach, it is expected that the 
RID Framework will identify a richer set of risks than any single method would on its own. 
There is another suggestion here that while no one method would identify all risks in a given 
system, the proposed RID Framework gathers methods in a structured way, to help identify a 
broader list of risks in one picture. 
Learning from the PHA methods and experience gained from the FMEA exercise provided 
valuable insights for constructing a structure for brainstorming in the proposed RID 
Framework. As observed in the FMEA exercise, a systematic approach to identifying risks was 
established from a functional failure point of view (Simsekler, 2015). However, some potential 
risks were left unidentified. The system diagram was methodically followed in FMEA, and 
some environmental and external risks were therefore left unidentified, as they were not 
explicitly shown in the diagram. This is why, during brainstorming, the RID Framework 
considers the use of SMAs (if relevant) to identify hot spots, along with the classification of 
risk sources. It is therefore expected that risks outside the range of the functional approaches, 
such as FMEA, will be identified. Despite some inevitable overlap with other approaches, the 
use of the RID Framework should identify a more complete set of risks (at least in terms of 
quantity), as future risks are also considered in a structured way. 
As pointed out in the literature, quantity breeds quality in risk identification (Smith et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the aim should be to identify as many risks relevant to given systems as possible. 
Another recommendation drawn from the literature is that criticism and analysis should be 
forbidden during brainstorming; preventing criticism provides the open atmosphere vital to 
productive brainstorming. 
During safety walkabouts, healthcare workers are expected to use all the knowledge gained in 
the system familiarisation and brainstorming stages to identify a range of patient safety risks. 
During such walkabouts, the NPSA contributing factors classification framework can be used 
as a checklist. 
3.3. Stage III: Presentation of the Risks 
At this stage, the goal is to record the identified risks in a clear manner. Current methods in 
healthcare, such as incident reporting and safety walkabouts, had different approaches to 
recording these risks. As a result, it was difficult to list all risk information in one place, as they 
had different structures and contents. It is therefore important to properly define risks, to enable 
collaborative use with other tools and methods in case of integration. 
As mentioned earlier, risk identification involves the identification of risk sources, events, their 
causes, and their potential consequences, according to the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO 31000, 2008). Ericson (2005) similarly defined risk with three 
components: hazardous elements, initiating mechanisms, and targets/threats. In parallel to 
these definitions of risk, most common PHA tools, such as FMEA and SWIFT, are used to 
identify similar components of hazards, causes, and possible effects. Taking such approaches 
into consideration, the following components are identified in the RID framework, to create a 
standard, structured description of risk:  
!! Hazard: what can go wrong? 
!! Potential cause: why/how could it go wrong? 
!! Potential effect: who/what is at risk? 
In addition to the definition of risk itself, Ericson (2005) emphasised that the presentation of 
risk should be clear, concise, and descriptive, as this helps a worker other than the original 
analyst to completely understand the risk. Moreover, clear risk presentation is vital in risk 
assessment, since it might be time-consuming and redundant to spend a great deal of time 
mitigating a low risk mistakenly thought to be a high risk. 
In addition to defining risk components, users are asked to identify the types of risk sources, to 
help understand that multiple risk sources can trigger hazardous situations.  
The overall conceptual structure of the RID Framework is depicted in Figure 2. Two 
components are shown in dotted outlines in this figure; these are adjustable inputs, dependent 
on the availability of resources. 
The presentation of the RID Framework with an example of a risk log sheet is presented in 
Table 3 as guidance. 
 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
 --- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 
4. Evaluation of the RID Framework 
4.1. Healthcare Setting  
The study was conducted at Gastroenterology Unit at the Cambridge University Hospitals 
Foundation Trust (CUHFT) to evaluate the RID Framework. The Hospital has approximately 
1,000 beds in total, employs over 7,000 staff, and offers the full range of local and tertiary 
services other than cardiothoracic surgery. As the chosen ward setting, the Gastroenterology 
Unit on Ward N2 is the designated ward for the care of gastroenterology patients. The beds in 
this ward are also available for patients who have acute Clostridium difficile infections. The 
ward has many tube-fed and line-fed patients. The ward managers therefore receive much input 
from nutrition nurse specialists, and work to ensure that the staff is trained in total parenteral 
nutrition (TPN) to help minimise the risk of infection. The ward has a number of different 
patients with special conditions, such as intestinal failure patients, and the ward managers want 
to help improve patient care. 
4.2. Study Participants  
In order to help produce representative samples by eliminating voluntary bias or non-response 
bias, the Patient Safety and Risk Unit at the Hospital was asked to select possible participants 
randomly. Seven participants were recruited in this case study to evaluate the RID Framework. 
Their job titles, experience in the NHS, and identifier codes are listed in Table 4. 
 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 
Because the participants in the study numbered only seven, outcomes may have been biased 
by each participant’s personal experiences, and by their available time and motivation. 
Significant efforts were therefore made to minimise bias during the evaluation stage, as the 
outcome of this study constitutes a considerable portion of the study.   
In the evaluation stage, there can be a tendency for respondents to indicate ‘yes’ or agree with 
questions, regardless of the questions’ content; this is known as acquiescence bias (Breakwell 
et al., 2000). In order to preclude such bias, the purpose and the process of the study were made 
clear in advance. Confidentiality regarding responses was clearly stressed, and participants 
were encouraged to be open about the usability and utility of the RID Framework. In order to 
identify issues that might cause participants to select the answer that favours positive results, 
the draft questionnaire was given to two clinicians as a formal pre-test, prior to its deployment 
to the actual participants. Such efforts were expected to be helpful in generalising the results 
from limited samples. 
4.3. Data Collection 
Two sets of data were collected in this study; the first included initial data about the chosen 
healthcare setting and were all collected prior to applying the RID Framework. This data 
collection was carried out with the help of the patient safety manager, based in the Patient 
Safety and Risk Unit, and the ward manager. As key participants in this study, these managers 
provided broad information about the ward, and all the inputs needed for the evaluation of the 
case study (e.g., ward layout, possible participants’ contact addresses, incident reports and risk 
registers from the chosen ward, etc.). 
The second set of data was gathered to assess the usefulness of the RID Framework, using a 
questionnaire. Two concepts — usability and usefulness — are used to evaluate this 
framework. At the end of the case study sessions, therefore, participants were asked to provide 
their feedback on the usability and usefulness of the RID Framework. Based on Nielsen’s 
description (Nielsen, 1993), Ward et al. stressed that the following factors should be considered 
when assessing usability and usefulness: learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors, and 
satisfaction (Ward et al., 2010). These were considered when selecting the content of the 
questionnaire. Having a questionnaire context similar to that of the work done previously, to 
evaluate the PHA Toolkit (Ward et al., 2010) was a particularly helpful resource in the 
development of the evaluation form. The content of that questionnaire helped to finalise the 
evaluation questionnaire used in the current research, which was presented to the participants 
to validate the usability and usefulness of the framework. 
The complexity of the questionnaire was kept to a minimum, and its presentation in the 
workshop was carefully prepared. The questionnaire largely relied on closed questions, where 
participants were limited to choosing one option from a number of fixed alternatives. The 
workshop and questionnaire were also conducted as a pilot study, with a clinician who 
suggested alternative questions prior to the real-world case study application. 
Evaluations were carried out using self-completed questionnaires, which, in contrast to 
interview-based questionnaires, were considered for two reasons. It was thought, first, that 
some participants might prefer to complete the questionnaire when they had more time, and 
second, that brainstorming or safety walkabout sessions might take more time than expected, 
due to unforeseen factors. In such circumstances, the participants would be asked to fill out the 
self-completed questionnaire at a convenient later time. 
4.4. Procedure 
Before conducting the case study, the authors created clear procedure, describing how to 
conduct the study. Thanks to the flexible nature of the RID Framework, it was possible to make 
two adjustments in this study. The first adjustment was not using the SMAs; the second was 
the use of the framework by individuals, since team-based data gathering had not been 
implemented in the previous stage. 
SMAs were not used for two main reasons. First, constructing proper SMAs requires a 
significant investment of man-hours by the hospital to supply proper data on the processes 
carried out in the chosen healthcare setting; this would have been difficult to arrange, due to 
the limited time of the staff involved. Second, due to the nature of the ward setting, both micro-
level and macro-level processes may occur; hence various procedures are carried out by 
different staff throughout the entire ward environment. For this reason, it would not be feasible 
to include SMAs for a range of processes in the ward; they were therefore not utilised in this 
study. 
Team-based brainstorming and safety walkabouts were not conducted in this study, although 
they were part of the initial plan. Despite significant effort was made to organize a team, it was 
difficult for participants to leave patients behind in the ward area for two straight hours, to join 
this research. Individual workshops were therefore arranged for each participant; each 
workshop took approximately two hours, including the RID Framework workshop and 
administration of the evaluation questionnaires. 
The main procedure, drawn from the RID Framework, is shown below: 
1.! System Familiarisation: using the following inputs to increase understanding of how 
systems behave, interact with their environment, and pose risks to patients. 
a.! System Description: describing the system in textual and graphical format 
b.! Sources of Risks: considering possible risk sources and asking what happens if 
these sources produce hazards 
c.! Nature of Hazards: considering the different nature of hazards 
d.! Time: considering time, working from past to future 
2.! Identification of Risks: identifying risks via brainstorming and safety walkabouts 
3.! Presentation of Risks: presenting the list of risks in a clear manner, using a predefined 
risk log sheet 
 
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1. Results on the Application of the RID Framework 
Each participant followed the framework individually, with facilitation and guidance provided 
by the author. The following inputs in the RID Framework were applied according to the pro-
cedure, to help provide a list of risks in the chosen ward setting. 
5.1.1. System Familiarisation: 
Step-I System Description: At this stage, the chosen ward setting was briefly described, 
textually and graphically. The textual description was accompanied by patient-centred maps 
participants were asked to draw, in order to enhance the understanding of the ward setting. By 
placing the patient at the centre, linked to a number of chains, a very simple figure was provided 
to the participants to help identify hazardous elements that might pose patient safety risks. After 
receiving the maps drawn by the participants, we were able to provide a more detailed visual 
map to increase understanding of a range of hazards that can affect patient safety in the chosen 
ward setting. This was helpful for participants in identifying a range of potential hazards. 
Another useful input at this stage was the ward layout. Participants found the layout helpful in 
identifying physical hazard elements. Some high-level risks in particular (e.g., security at 
entrance doors, visibility of patient rooms, etc.) were initially captured by using the ward 
layout.  
Step-II Sources of Risks: At this stage, the classification of risk sources was introduced to the 
participants. As highlighted earlier, this classification was based on the NPSA RCA 
classification framework (NPSA, 2009) with some adjustments. Some participants stated that 
they had previously used this instrument in incident investigation, but had never used it as a 
checklist for proactive risk identification. A potential contribution was that previous knowledge 
of this classification increased the use of this input throughout the risk identification process. 
In addition to the knowledge gained from the visual system description, participants were now 
able to classify risk sources in the chosen ward area. 
While only the main components of the classification were supplied to participants during the 
brainstorming session, the complete classification, with detailed components, was provided 
during the safety walkabout session. The full classification components were not presented 
during the brainstorming sessions because they could have inhibited the imagination of new 
risks. The presentation of the complete list of components was therefore delayed until the safety 
walkabout, when it enabled participants to use it as a checklist to help avoid missing potential 
sources of risks. It is expected that the inputs of the RID Framework will be used during both 
brainstorming and safety walkabout sessions. Moreover, participants were also encouraged to 
engage with other staff working in the ward area. As a good example of this, it was rewarding 
to see that one participant entered into a dialogue with a nurse regarding a fire procedure, taking 
into account the training, which identified this source of risk from the provided checklist. The 
participant asked the nurse about the fire procedure; the lack of knowledge about this was then 
identified by the participant as a potential risk arising from training issues relating to fire 
occurrences. 
It was observed that participants found the classification of risk sources very helpful throughout 
the brainstorming session; it was also felt, however, that the full component lists in the NPSA 
RCA framework classification are too detailed to be used as a checklist in the short timeframe 
of a safety walkabout session. This was an expected outcome during the safety walkabout, 
because the classification was not specifically developed for use in a ward setting. One of the 
potential contributions of the RID Framework is expected to be the identification of a broad 
list of risks in a chosen area, and the use of this list as a specific checklist for use in future risk 
identification sessions. 
Step-III Nature of Hazards: At this stage, the categorisation of hazards was introduced to the 
participants; none had used such a categorisation before. It was useful to stimulate the 
imagination of new risks in the ward environment; this, moreover, provided valuable insights 
into hazards of different natures that might occur in the complex and changeable ward 
environment. For instance, throughout the safety walkabout, it was gratifying to observe that 
some participants were looking not only for obvious hazards, but also concealed hazards in 
different settings (e.g., infection issues in the sluice room) within the ward environment. 
Step-IV Time: Participants were asked at this stage to consider past, present, and possible 
future risks. The author selected eight specific incidents to share with participants, in order to 
raise awareness of past issues in the chosen ward area. The participants were expected to 
mention some examples of risks caused by different risk sources, and different in nature; 
moreover, it was pointed out that similar risks could occur in future. It was observed that review 
of previous incidents stimulated the imagination of new risks; this review also helped 
participants understand what went wrong in the chosen ward area, and, as with similar 
experiences in the past, what might go wrong in future due to change. One result was that some 
participants focused on possible changes expected in room settings and their future impact. 
5.1.2. Identification of Risks: 
Brainstorming and safety walkabouts, used as risk identification approaches, are included in 
the RID Framework. In the current study, difficulties were experienced in initiating risk 
identification during the brainstorming sessions, since most participants had little or no 
experience with this method. Participants experienced difficulties with knowing how to start 
identifying risks in these brainstorming sessions. 
Similar issues were experienced during the safety walkabouts; however, the use of risk source 
classifications provided helpful guidance, in the form of a checklist for capturing patient safety 
risks. It was also observed participants began identifying risks in terms of their individual 
backgrounds: the consultant physician began by reviewing the drug charts and patient records, 
while the nurses started by identifying equipment-related risks, as they mostly interacted with 
this kind of thing in ward settings. 
In the brainstorming sessions, the judgements of participants were more subjective, owing to 
the semi-structured brainstorming process (in contrast with a typical FMEA session, in which 
SMAs are strictly followed, and no further judgements are made regarding external risks). This 
made the motivation of participants an important factor affecting the success of the risk 
identification. Since the success of risk identification is partially related to the motivation of 
the participants, it can be noted that different results might have been obtained with a different 
group of participants, or with the same participants at a different time. Moreover, more risks 
might have been captured with less (or no) time pressure. 
5.1.3. Presentation of the Risks: 
A risk log (as shown in Table 3) was provided to each participant, to record the risks they 
identified.  
In the course of this case study, 120 risks were identified from the chosen ward setting. 
However, it was noted that some participants had to skip the identification of causes and effects, 
due to their limited time. Identifying the three components of risk — hazard, cause, and effect 
— was relatively new to the participants. A significant effort was needed to identify causes 
just after identifying hazards. Despite such issues experienced at the beginning of the study, 
the participants used the NPSA RCA classification framework to capture potential causes. It 
was rewarding to note that in some cases participants identified multiple causes and effects for 
a single hazard. Further, participants identified the lack of safety culture as a potential cause of 
risks. This was an expected contribution of the framework, which successfully raises awareness 
of safety culture. 
5.2 Observation on Usability and Utility of the RID Framework 
As described above, the questionnaire was designed to give participants the opportunity to 
provide feedback on the usability and usefulness of the RID Framework. The questions were 
selected to evaluate the usefulness of the framework, with respect to the identified requirements 
and components of the RID Framework. 
The findings from the evaluation forms are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. Five-point scales 
(poor: 1 – excellent: 5) were used and numerical formats were employed to aid numerical 
analysis. Table 5 shows the average rate for each statement and how many of the seven 
participants agreed on each scale, according to their opinions of the usability of the framework. 
 --- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
 
The questions above allowed participants to evaluate the usability of the main components of 
the framework, and their supporting role in risk identification. In general, the scores showed 
that the framework had a positive impact on risk identification. None of the questions resulted 
in strong disagreement, averaging neutral to disagreeing. It was also noted that there were 
considerably more responses falling into the ‘agree’ category than the ‘strongly agree’ 
category. As shown in the first question in Table 5, participants generally agreed that the 
framework was easy to use; similarly, participants mostly agreed that they would use the 
framework for risk identification in future. They also agreed that the use of sources of risk, 
nature of hazards, time, and system description were helpful, and increased the understanding 
of system while stimulating the imagination of new risks. Table 5 shows the quantitative data 
collected, but some qualitative data regarding the usability of the framework were also 
gathered, as follows: 
“Defining hazard is most difficult part. Contributory factors framework is very good 
but too detailed.” [GC-06] 
“I found it confusing initially but do recognise that thinking about situations in a 
different way will help.” [GC-07] 
After the evaluation of the usability of the framework, the following section was used to gather 
feedback on the usefulness of the RID Framework. Table 6 shows the average rate for each 
statement, and how many of the seven participants agreed on each scale, according to their 
experience. 
 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
As shown in Table 6, participants found the framework encouraging in its usefulness. All 
participants except one agreed that they were able to perform the RID Framework. As an 
expected benefit of the framework, participants generally agreed that they were now more 
aware of system-wide safety risks. While participants believed they would find the framework 
useful in their work, they also agreed that they would not have identified the same risks using 
another framework, or no framework. 
Table 6 presents the quantitative data collected, but some qualitative data regarding the 
usefulness of the framework were also gathered, as follows: 
 “Framework made me think more broadly e.g. not just visual inspection but talking to 
staff, patients, looking [at] documentations, [reviewing] past incidents.” [GC-06] 
“I believe it would be easier to apply to individual areas with some training. We do 
have many generic risk assessment[s] and most are appropriate. We don’t write many 
for each unit which would be more important and relative.” [GC-07] 
5.3 Written Feedback in the Questionnaire 
Six questions were asked in the last section of the questionnaire, to gain further feedback on 
the usefulness of the RID Framework. These questions sought to determine whether applying 
the framework had changed the participants’ attitudes regarding the identification of patient 
safety risks. The responses are summarised below: 
!! Did the use of the Risk Identification Framework reveal any significant risks of which 
you were previously unaware? If so, could you describe them? In keeping with the 
responses participants gave to the previous question (see utility section, statement 8), most 
stated that they are now aware of different risks, risks that could not have been identified 
without the use of the RID Framework. Because the framework revealed significant risks, 
participants found it helpful in stimulating the imagination of different types of risks in a 
structured way. Some comments are as follows: 
“It helped me collect my thoughts and work through why risks occur.” [GC-03] 
“Not hugely significant but concealed risks found in ward areas i.e. sluice room.” 
[GC-04] 
!! Did you find the definition of a risk (hazard, potential cause, and potential effect) 
difficult to follow in risk identification? Did you find any of them more difficult to 
identify than others? This question addressed an important aspect of presenting risks 
using the RID Framework. Most participants specifically mentioned the difficulties 
involved in identifying hazards as initial components of the risks. A few comments were 
also made regarding the complexity of the approach, particularly in identifying different 
components of each defined risk. A selection of answers to this question from several 
participants is presented below: 
“It was difficult to follow at the time of the walkabout. Easier when looking back after-
wards. Initially identified hazards as equipment that were then changed to organiza-
tional. Probably just the time factor in completing this today.” [GC-02] 
“Yes, to begin with but this did become clearer the more I did.” [GC-04] 
“Hazard: hard to define and categorise.” [GC-05] 
“Hazard difficult to define.” [GC-06] 
“I did initially get confused. Needed to ‘rethink’ the process for identifying risk.” 
[GC-07] 
!! Have you ever thought about different sources of risk in risk identification before this 
project? Did you find it helpful to imagine relevant hazards and risks in this area? 
Generally, participants found the identification of sources of risks helpful in imagining 
relevant hazards and risks. One participant also emphasised that visiting the area was more 
valuable when considering risk sources than trying to imagine what the risks were. Selected 
comments are presented below: 
“Only briefly. Yes, it is helpful. Would be more helpful in my specific place of work.” 
[GC-01] 
“Very helpful tool.” [GC-03] 
“No, I find the standards on risk / incident forms very narrow — this encouraged 
broader thinking.” [GC-04] 
“This is a wider view of hazards.” [GC-05] 
“Yes, now more aware of some areas of hazards / risks than others. Found visiting the 
area more valuable than trying to imagine what the risks were.” [GC-06] 
“Helpful, I would like to use this a bit more to really get the sense of improved 
identification of risk. I believe it will be good.” [GC-07] 
!! Have you ever thought about the different nature of hazards in risk identification 
before this project? Did you find it helpful to imagine relevant hazards and risks in 
this area? Categorisation of the different nature of hazards was found very helpful by the 
participants, in both the brainstorming and safety walkabout stages. The participants also 
pointed out the benefit of using such an input together with the ward layout. A selection of 
answers to this question is presented below: 
“Very helpful tool.” [GC-03] 
“No, I was not thinking of concealed or developing hazards and will use in service 
development.” [GC-04] 
“Checking ward plan was useful. I haven’t done it before. It was a help.” [GC-05] 
“Yes, again better to see area than try to imagine the risks.” [GC-06] 
“Having the floor plan made it easy as could ‘visualize’ better. Perhaps looked at dif-
ferent things.” [GC-07] 
!! Are there any notable omissions in the Risk Identification Framework? If so, could 
you describe them? No negative comments were made on the content of the framework 
in general. However, participants did indicate three notable omissions from the framework, 
and while the first two (patient complaints and using a team-based approach) were already 
considered in the content of the framework; they were not included in this case study. The 
third comment was not taken into account in the development of the framework. During 
the case study, participants (mainly managers) several times highlighted the need to 
consider financial issues in safety studies. Their comments included the following: 
“Not obvious. May think of something given time. Using a team approach may be 
beneficial.” [GC-04] 
“Patient input?” [GC-05] 
“Finance?” [GC-06] 
!! Do you think this framework might be a good starting point for identifying possible 
risks in each department in the hospital? Most participants made positive responses 
regarding the usability and usefulness of the framework. The comments about its practical 
benefits and possible benefits for cultural change were the main motivation for developing 
a new risk identification framework. The following is a selection of written answers to this 
question: 
 
“It could be a useful tool which has some added detail and contributory factors over 
and above our risk assessment process.” [GC-02] 
 
“Yes, this tool helps frame questions and discover cause of hazard. Will help managers 
and clinicians consider ‘ward culture’ which will help develop future models for 
managing risk and hazard [in] wards, clinics and hospitals.” [GC-03] 
 
“Helpful addition — very detailed as a starting point to RMIS, complaints etc. This 
could be used to combine existing information to one single library.” [GC-05] 
 
In summary, many comments were collected, including positive and negative views of the 
framework; the comments regarding the usefulness of the RID Framework, however, were 
mainly positive. Although significant efforts were made to limit bias and its impact on the 
validity of the outcomes, it could still be argued that the outcomes might have been different 
had the study been conducted in another healthcare setting and/or with more participants. 
Acknowledging such limitations, it can be said that applying and evaluating the RID 
Framework in other healthcare settings would strengthen the validity of the results. However, 
both qualitative and quantitative results derived at the evaluation stage can be claimed to serve 
as reliable indicators of what can be accomplished within the timeframe employed in the study. 
 
6. Discussion 
Throughout the case study, the RID Framework made available an integrated approach to 
proactive risk identification, employing a number of inputs from reactive and proactive tools. 
The framework helped identify as many relevant risks as possible. However, even after these 
efforts, two questions still remained, namely: whether (1) identified risks are realistic, and (2) 
all potential risks were identified through use of the framework. 
The framework gave good results in terms of quantity of risks identified (n = 120). However, 
the quality of the results remains a question for the present, because no estimation can be made 
of what percentage of risks might actually result in harm. 
Within the scope of risk management, a risk cannot be evaluated or mitigated until it is 
identified. Further, there might be no actions to take to avoid or diminish the effects of 
unidentified risks. Though this study had tended to lean towards identification, a clear strategy 
should be in place to balance effort between identification, assessment and mitigation. It may 
be true that a few well identified key risks would receive more attention from management, 
while too many risks with little analysis would get neglected; for this reason, it should be noted 
that the quantity of risks is not the only indicator of success, although quantity can breed quality 
(Smith et al., 2008). Hence the transition between the risk management stages should be well 
defined in order to develop an optimal risk mitigation strategy.!
We observed in the course of this study that it is difficult to ensure that all possible risks are 
taken into account, and therefore the next stage of risk assessment should always be considered 
as an option. From this vantage, it appears that risk identification is a never-ending process, 
and the most difficult aspect of the risk assessment process is probably that it involves the 
highest level of uncertainty driving the scope of error of the evaluation. While all these factors 
indicate that a range of risks must be identified in the first place, it also encourages the use of 
a number of approaches for identifying different types of risks.  
The contribution of the RID Framework can also be shown by referring to safety culture. The 
RID Framework aims first to contribute to organisations at the safety culture level, by 
encouraging workers to identify safety concerns proactively. The RID Framework, an 
integrated approach, is expected to cover all reactive results (e.g., results of incident 
investigations) in its content. The framework also includes the safety walkabout process; hence, 
it is likely to cover a range of risks identified by pure safety walkabout studies (even more so, 
since checklists are also used in the RID Framework). 
Based on the research activities carried out as described, the value of this novel framework lies 
in its ability to subsume the power of current methods in a systems approach, as well as 
considering future risks — this makes the approach prognostic, rather than merely reactive and 
proactive. The RID Framework suggests using future areas of change as prompts for imagining 
future risks. Therefore, the changes in technology, functions, and procedures within the seven 
healthcare categories are explicitly considered to potentially point to additional risks that may 
not emerge from the use of other traditional approaches. The results of this study still show, 
however, that the RID Framework should not be used as a stand-alone tool, and suggest the use 
of multiple approaches to provide a comprehensive list of risks.  
Our findings should be considered in view of study limitations. For instance, while the 
framework suggests using less resource (e.g. cost and time) to encourage systems approaches 
in the identification of patient safety risks, in this study, we did not explicitly assess its resource 
intensiveness or benchmark with other tools and methods. This can be evaluated in future 
research to indicate what resources and support (e.g. minimum or ideal) needed for each stage 
of the RID Framework. Further, it should be noted that this study was conducted at a particular 
healthcare setting in one NHS trust with limited number of participants. It therefore remains 
unclear to what extent the finding of this study generalise the usability of the framework to 
other type of healthcare settings, trusts, other countries, or even other types of industries. To 
obtain better results for validating the framework, further case studies can be conducted in 
different healthcare settings. 
Finally, it should also be noted that simply identifying risks, without deep analysis, might have 
a negative impact on risk culture, as misidentification could generate bad decisions, resulting 
in real risks. This, in turn, recalls the idea that having a well-defined transition between identi-
fication and assessment helps to develop optimal risk mitigation strategies in healthcare 
organisations. If these are not considered in the risk identification process, designing or 
applying new tools (including the RID Framework) may result in a risk bureaucracy, but will 
not contribute to risk culture in healthcare. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The RID Framework aims to integrate the power of using both reactive and proactive 
approaches to help identity a list of patient safety risks by providing fundamental guidance to 
healthcare users. In this study, the RID Framework was developed and then applied through a 
case study. It was also evaluated to assess its usability and usefulness in risk identification in a 
real-world healthcare setting.  
The application of the RID Framework was completed successfully. In general, it was noted 
that the framework can be of practical benefit to the risk identification process and potentially 
aid cultural change for safety improvement. Throughout the case study, 120 risks were 
identified. 
The evaluation of the framework provided valuable insights into its usability and usefulness. 
Using mainly positive comments, participants agreed that the framework was useful in 
identifying risks proactively, with the help of the inputs embedded in the content of the 
framework. Participants also pointed out a few notable omissions that could be incorporated 
into the framework; these included, primarily, the need for input from patients, executing the 
framework as a team effort, and consideration of financial aspects. 
The results indicated that the RID Framework can help improve the practice of risk 
identification in healthcare. It should be noted, however, that the results do not confirm that the 
framework can identify all relevant risks in a given system. It is therefore suggested that the 
framework should not be used in isolation, but in conjunction with other tools and methods, in 
a structured way, so as to not undervalue risks identified using any other tools and methods. 
Otherwise, efforts along these lines would likely develop a risk bureaucracy, but not a risk 
culture. 
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1 ✓ ✓ ✓ Systems-based approach Increasing the understanding on how systems behave, interact with their environment and pose risks to patients ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2 ✓ ✓ ✓ Adaptability Adaptable within a broader risk management context ✓  ✓ ✓   
3 ✓ ✓ ✓ Considering current culture 
Adaptable to the current safety culture to help strive for 
becoming more proactive ✓  ✓   ✓ 
4 ✓ ✓ ✓ Less-resource intensiveness 
Providing flexibility to add and remove inputs and methods 
depending on resources available ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
5 ✓ ✓ ✓ Compatibility Open to be used in line with other tools and methods ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ 
6 ✓ ✓ ✓ Usability Easy to be used by range of people from different backgrounds (e.g. consultants, nurses and managers) ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
7 ✓ ✓ ✓ Practicality Applicable in real healthcare settings ✓    ✓  
8 ✓ ✓ ✓ Flexibility Open to be used by individuals or teams ✓     ✓ 
9 ✓   
System description Increasing system understanding to help identify system-related 
risks ✓  ✓ ✓   
10 ✓   
Categorisation on risk 
sources 
Stimulating the imagination of new risks in complex healthcare 
systems 
 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  
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11 ✓   Categorisation on nature of hazards 
Stimulating the imagination of new risks in changeable 
healthcare systems ✓  ✓   ✓ 
12 ✓   Considering from past to future 
Along with the increased awareness on past experience, being 
proactive and prognostic to consider present and future changes ✓ ✓    ✓ 
13 ✓   Using system mapping approaches 
Identifying hot-spots by an SMA chosen through the rate of past 
incidents or interview with key system users ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
14  ✓  Structured brainstorming Considering different sources of risks in a structured way ✓     ✓ 
15  ✓  Safety walkabout with the use of checklist 
Considering a detailed checklist during the safety walkabout to 
cover a range of risk sources ✓  ✓    
16   ✓ Utility of risk output Increasing the understanding on risk theory to provide a list of risks in a clear manner ✓  ✓ ✓   
17   ✓ Quality of risk output Identifying realistic risks that can potentially impact on patient safety ✓     ✓ 
18   ✓ Quantity of risk output Identifying as many relevant risks as possible to help provide a comprehensive list of risks ✓   ✓  ✓ 
 
Table 1 Capturing Requirements on Risk Identification2
                                               
2 Further information on rationale behind requirements and reasoning behind the selection of each research method can be found in the Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the 
University of Cambridge, titled as “Design for Patient Safety: A Systems-based Risk Identification Framework” (Simsekler, 2015).  
  
 
 
Table 2 SMAs and Characteristics of Risk Sources (Simsekler et al., 2018) 
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Task9related+risks+ + ! ✓+ ✓! + ✓+
Environmental+risks+ + + + ✓+ ✓+ ✓+
Equipment9related+risks+ + ✓+ + + + ✓+
Communication+risks+ + ✓+ + ✓+ ✓+ ✓+
Organisational+risks+ + + + ✓+ ✓+ ✓+
Staff9sourced+risks+ ✓+ + + ✓+ + ✓+
Patient9sourced+risks+ + ✓! + + + ✓!
 Name: Job Title: Ward / Clinic Area: Date: 
    
REFERENCE LIST OF CONTIBUTORY FACTORS 
This is the list of potential source/cause of risks associated with the task in the ward/clinic area stated above. Please consider all the references listed below. 
Patient-related Risks Staff-related Risks Task-related Risks Communication Risks Equipment-related Risks Environmental Risks Organisational Risks 
Clinical Condition Physical Issues Guidelines, Policies and Procedures Verbal Communication Displays Administrative Factors 
Organisational 
structure 
Physical Factors Psychological Issues Decision Making Aids Written Communication Integrity Design of Physical Environment Priorities 
Social factors Social Domestic Procedural or Task Design Non verbal Communication Positioning Environment Externally imported risks 
Mental/ Psychological 
Factors Personality Issues  Communication Management Usability Staffing Safety culture 
Interpersonal Relationships Cognitive Factors    Work load and hours of work Training and team-related risks 
  Time 
IDENTIFIED RISKS 
No
. Source Type 
Hazard                                                      
(What can go wrong?) 
Potential Cause                                                
(Why / How it could go wrong?) 
Potential Effect                                             
(Who / What is at risk?) 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
Table 3 Risk Identification Log
RISK IDENTIFICATION LOG 
 No. Job title Experience in 
the NHS 
Training on Risk 
Management 
Identifier 
1 Consultant Physician 20 years No GC-01 
2 Nurse 29 years Yes, risk management GC-02 
3 Operations Manager 23 years Yes, all GC-03 
4 Operations Manager 28 years Yes, risk officer training GC-04 
5 Patient Safety Manager 11 years Yes, RCA GC-05 
6 Divisional Lead Nurse 30 years Yes, risk management GC-06 
7 Senior Clinical Nurse 20 years Yes, risk officer training GC-07 
 
Table 4 Participants in RID Framework evaluation 
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Ave. 
1 
I think the framework is easy to use 
0 0 1 5 1 4.0 
2 I think that I would like to use this framework when I perform risk identification 0 0 1 5 1 4.0 
3 The framework goes into an appropriate level of detail to help me undertake risk identification 0 0 2 3 2 4.0 
4 The components of the risk identification framework are well integrated 0 1 1 4 1 3.71 
5 Most healthcare staff would learn to use this framework quickly 0 0 3 3 1 3.71 
6 Considering system familiarization is helpful in the risk identification framework 0 2 1 2 2 3.57 
7 Considering different time (past to future) is helpful in risk identification 0 2 0 4 1 3.57 
8 Considering different nature of hazards is helpful in risk identification 0 1 1 4 1 3.71 
9 Considering different sources of risk is helpful in risk identification 0 2 0 1 4 4.0 
10 The framework stimulates me to imagine new hazards and risks 0 0 1 3 3 4.29 
11 The use of ward drawing is helpful in identifying possible hazardous points. 0 1 0 3 3 4.14 
12 The use of contributory factors classification framework is helpful in risk identification. 0 0 3 2 2 3.86 
13 Using past incident examples is helpful in imagining possible hazards and risks 1 0 1 1 4 4.0 
Table 5 Participants’ responses on the usability of the RID Framework 
 
Q. Utility 
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1 I could perform the RID Framework 0 1 0 5 1 3.86 
2 I am more aware of system-wide safety risks 0 0 2 4 1 3.86 
3 I found a change in my perception of safety hazards 
and risks 0 0 3 2 2 3.86 
4 Using the framework would improve work practices 0 0 3 2 2 3.86 
5 Using the framework would improve the understanding 
of risk identification in the NHS 0 2 0 3 2 3.71 
6 Using the framework might help us have a specific risk 
library in each department 0 2 1 1 3 3.71 
7 The RID Framework would be useful in my work 0 2 0 3 2 3.71 
8 I think that I would have identified the same risks 
without using the RID Framework 1 3 3 0 0 2.26 
Table 6 Participants’ responses on the utility of the RID Framework
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 Risk Identification Framework in a simplistic manner 
 
 Figure 2 Risk Identification Framework 
